Decoded

Re-parsed whenever the input changes
ValidSignature matchesHS256 · HMAC + SHA-256typ JWT2 custom fields
TokenHeader Payload Signature
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2hhdmV5Yi5jb20iLCJzdWIiOiIxMDA4NiIsImF1ZCI6ImhhdmV5Yi13ZWIiLCJuYW1lIjoi5byg5LiJIiwiYWRtaW4iOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTc4OTc4MjUxMCwibmJmIjoxNzg5NzgyNTEwLCJleHAiOjE4MjEzMTg1MTAsImp0aSI6ImM0YTdmMmUxLTliM2QtNGE1OC04ZjBjLTdlMmQxYTZiNWM5MyJ9.TmLdP8JpksuOmJ1WIGC6h3D7d3eVZ38tshKc-XEbMrE

Header

First part · describes the token itself
{
  "alg": "HS256",
  "typ": "JWT"
}

Symmetric signing: one key for both signing and verifying (32+ bytes is safer)

Payload

Second part · just base64url, not encryption
{
  "iss": "https://haveyb.com",
  "sub": "10086",
  "aud": "haveyb-web",
  "name": "张三",
  "admin": true,
  "iat": 1789782510,
  "nbf": 1789782510,
  "exp": 1821318510,
  "jti": "c4a7f2e1-9b3d-4a58-8f0c-7e2d1a6b5c93"
}

Signature

Third part · a signature, not JSON
TmLdP8JpksuOmJ1WIGC6h3D7d3eVZ38tshKc-XEbMrE

Running the algorithm from the header over the first two parts produces this string. The server recomputes it and compares — a mismatch means the content was altered. The signature itself carries no user data.

Signature matches — this signature was produced with that key

JWT is not encryption: the header and payload are only base64url encoded, anyone holding the token can decode them — keep passwords, ID numbers and keys out of the payload.

A signature prevents tampering, not disclosure: the payload travels as plaintext; the signature only proves it was not modified, it does not hide it from anyone.

Three things to configure: HTTPS everywhere, a short expiry, and server-side checks against an algalgorithm allowlist that rejects untrusted algorithms.

Claims explained

9 · time claims converted to your timezone